Understand Your Rights. Solve Your Legal Problems
The UK government has announced a new immigration policy offering payments of up to £40,000 to failed asylum seeker families who agree to leave the country voluntarily. The proposal, unveiled this week, forms part of a pilot programme designed to reduce the growing cost of the UK’s asylum system.
Under the proposal announced by Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood, families whose asylum claims and appeals have been rejected could receive £10,000 per person — capped at £40,000 per household — if they agree to return voluntarily to their home country.
The policy has sparked political debate and raised questions about how the UK’s immigration system operates. Legally, however, the proposal is not as unprecedented as it may first appear.
The UK already operates a voluntary return scheme that provides financial assistance to migrants who leave the country voluntarily. The government’s new proposal would effectively expand the scale of that existing financial incentive.
The UK government is piloting payments of up to £40,000 for failed asylum seeker families who agree to leave the country voluntarily.
The policy builds on the Home Office Voluntary Returns Service, which currently provides up to £3,000 in financial support for migrants who leave voluntarily.
The UK’s asylum system costs around £4 billion per year, with more than 100,000 people living in government-funded accommodation according to Home Office figures.
Ministers argue voluntary departures are cheaper and easier to manage than enforced removals.
The policy could still face legal scrutiny through judicial review in UK courts, depending on how it is implemented.
The voluntary return payment scheme is designed to reduce the cost of supporting migrants whose asylum claims and appeals have been exhausted but who remain in the UK.
In a speech delivered on 5 March 2026, Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood said supporting families in asylum accommodation can cost up to £158,000 per year.
The UK’s asylum support system currently costs around £4 billion per year, with more than 100,000 people living in government-funded accommodation.
Ministers argue that financial incentives for voluntary departure could reduce these costs while avoiding lengthy and complex deportation proceedings.
If migrants refuse voluntary return, the government has indicated it may proceed with enforced removal where individuals can legally be returned to their home countries.
Yes — under existing UK immigration policy.
The UK government already operates the Home Office Voluntary Returns Service, which allows migrants to leave the country voluntarily rather than through enforced removal.
Eligible migrants can currently receive up to £3,000 in financial support, along with travel arrangements and reintegration assistance after returning to their home country.
Migrants may qualify for voluntary return assistance if they:
are in the UK illegally
have overstayed their visa
have withdrawn an immigration application
have had an asylum claim refused
Financial support is typically issued via a payment card that can only be used after the individual has returned to their home country.
The proposed £40,000 payment would therefore represent a significantly larger incentive within an existing legal framework, rather than the creation of a new immigration power.
Financial incentives for voluntary departure are widely used across Europe as part of immigration enforcement policies.
Denmark — which the UK government referenced when discussing the policy — offers reintegration payments to migrants who agree to return voluntarily rather than face forced removal.
Germany and Sweden also operate assisted return programmes that combine financial support with travel arrangements and reintegration assistance for migrants returning to their home countries.
Governments often prefer voluntary returns because they are generally cheaper and less legally complex than deportations, which can involve detention, court appeals and complex logistical arrangements.
Even where the government has legal authority to operate voluntary return schemes, immigration policies can still be challenged through judicial review in the UK courts.
Claimants could argue that the policy is unlawful if it is implemented unfairly or if it breaches human rights protections.
Possible legal questions could include:
whether migrants are properly informed before accepting payments
whether eligibility rules are applied consistently
whether child welfare considerations are properly assessed
whether the policy complies with human rights law
These arguments would not necessarily invalidate the programme but could influence how the policy is implemented in practice.
One of the most sensitive legal aspects of the policy involves families with children.
If voluntary departure is refused, the government has indicated that enforced removals may follow where migrants no longer have the legal right to remain in the UK.
Removal decisions must comply with the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorporates the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law.
Immigration cases involving removal frequently raise legal arguments under:
Article 8, which protects the right to family life
Article 3, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment
UK courts must also consider the best interests of the child, which immigration law requires authorities to treat as a primary consideration in removal decisions.
Governments often favour voluntary return programmes because enforced removals can be expensive and legally complex.
According to figures cited in the immigration reform speech, the Home Office removed nearly 60,000 people with no legal right to remain in the UK last year, a figure ministers say has increased significantly.
Encouraging migrants to leave voluntarily can reduce the need for detention, enforcement operations and lengthy court proceedings.
However, some critics argue that large financial incentives could create unintended incentives, particularly if migrants believe a failed asylum claim might still lead to financial support.
March 2026
Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood announces a pilot scheme offering voluntary return payments of up to £40,000 for certain failed asylum seeker families.
2026
The government begins a limited pilot programme, targeting a small number of families whose asylum claims and appeals have been rejected.
Future
Ministers have indicated the scheme could be expanded across the wider asylum system if voluntary departures increase.
The £40,000 voluntary return payment scheme will initially operate as a limited pilot programme involving a small number of families whose asylum claims and appeals have already been rejected. If ministers conclude that the scheme increases voluntary departures, it could later be expanded across the wider asylum system.
Any broader rollout would likely attract scrutiny from immigration lawyers, human rights organisations and parliamentary committees, particularly in relation to how the policy is implemented and whether it complies with existing legal safeguards.
More broadly, the proposal highlights a challenge facing immigration systems across Europe: how governments balance border enforcement, public spending and humanitarian obligations once asylum claims have been exhausted.
Yes. The UK already operates a voluntary returns programme that helps migrants return to their home country with financial assistance and travel support.
The government argues that voluntary return incentives may be cheaper than housing migrants in asylum accommodation while legal removal processes continue.
Under current Home Office guidance migrants may receive up to £3,000. The new pilot programme would offer much larger payments for certain families.
Yes. Once asylum claims and appeals have been exhausted, migrants can be removed if there are no legal barriers preventing deportation.
The UK Supreme Court will examine whether English courts can set global FRAND licence terms in a closely watched dispute between Tesla, Inc. and InterDigital Patent Holdings, Inc. after granting permission to appeal in January 2026.
The case centres on Tesla’s challenge to a non-negotiable $32-per-vehicle royalty under the Avanci patent pool for connected cars.
A full hearing is scheduled for 27–29 April 2026. The appeal tests the jurisdictional reach of UK courts in standard-essential patent (SEP) licensing — an issue with direct implications for automotive manufacturers, telecom licensors and platform-based royalty models. The outcome could influence where global FRAND disputes are litigated and how much leverage implementers can exert.
The proceedings arise from InterDigital’s licensing of patents declared essential to ETSI 2G through 5G standards. Those patents are bundled in the Avanci 5G Platform, which aggregates licences for connected-vehicle use.
Tesla plans to deploy 5G-enabled vehicles in the UK, its fourth-largest global market. It disputes the platform’s flat-rate structure, arguing the terms are not fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). In December 2023, Tesla sought declarations concerning patent validity and the appropriate FRAND terms covering approximately 11,900 UK SEPs.
InterDigital challenged the English courts’ jurisdiction. The High Court set aside service in part, and the Court of Appeal dismissed Tesla’s appeal by majority in March 2025, with Arnold LJ dissenting on aspects of the jurisdictional analysis. Tesla now appeals to the Supreme Court, while InterDigital pursues a cross-appeal.
The UK Supreme Court has not yet issued a substantive ruling. On 21 January 2026, the Court granted permission to appeal, confirming a three-day hearing for late April.
The Court is expected to consider whether English judges can determine FRAND terms at an implementer’s request when an intermediary offers the licence. It will also examine how civil procedure rules on international service and forum apply in SEP licensing disputes involving patent pools.
To date, the litigation has focused on jurisdiction rather than the appropriate FRAND rate. Tesla has positioned England as a suitable forum for determining licensing conditions applicable to UK SEPs.
InterDigital successfully argued at earlier stages that the dispute was not properly anchored in England. The Court of Appeal majority upheld the High Court’s approach to service and jurisdiction, concluding that Tesla’s claims, as framed, could not proceed in England. The court nevertheless recognised the case arises in a rapidly developing area of FRAND jurisprudence.
The commercial context is significant. Tesla requires licences to sell 5G-enabled vehicles in the UK — its fourth-largest global market — while the Avanci platform aggregates roughly 11,900 UK SEPs offered at a flat per-vehicle rate. Where implementers challenge standardised pool pricing as non-FRAND, the choice of forum can materially affect royalty exposure and negotiation dynamics.
The Supreme Court’s decision to hear the appeal indicates that the jurisdictional boundaries of English courts in global SEP disputes remain unsettled.
Forum strategy remains in focus: The appeal will test how far English courts can reach into global SEP licensing disputes, a key consideration for multinational technology and automotive groups.
Patent pool pricing faces scrutiny: Tesla’s challenge to the $32-per-vehicle licence reflects increasing implementer resistance to rigid pool royalty structures.
Connected-vehicle economics are exposed: With thousands of UK SEPs tied to automotive connectivity, the eventual ruling could influence future cost considerations across the sector.
Negotiation leverage may evolve: If implementers can seek FRAND determinations in England, licensors may face greater pressure in cross-border licensing discussions.
April hearing is a key watch point: The Supreme Court’s judgment is likely to provide important guidance for SEP litigation strategy.
The Supreme Court hearing is scheduled to conclude on 29 April 2026. A written judgment will follow in due course. If the Court finds jurisdiction in England, the dispute is expected to return to the Patents Court for further proceedings on the licensing issues.
Court: UK Supreme Court
Date: Permission granted 21 January 2026
Case name: Tesla, Inc and others v InterDigital Patent Holdings, Inc and another (No 2)
Docket number: UKSC/2025/0058/A
Area of law: Intellectual property / standard-essential patents
Result: Permission to appeal granted; hearing pending
A federal jury in Greenbelt, Maryland has convicted prominent appellate attorney Thomas C. Goldstein of tax evasion and mortgage fraud, according to the U.S. Department of Justice.
Goldstein — who argued more than 40 cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and co-founded the legal website SCOTUSblog — was found guilty following a trial in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. Prosecutors alleged he concealed millions of dollars in income and liabilities over a multi-year period.
The case is being prosecuted by the Justice Department’s Criminal Division Tax Section and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Maryland, with the IRS Criminal Investigation division and the FBI investigating.
According to the DOJ, Goldstein was the sole owner of Goldstein & Russell, P.C., a boutique appellate litigation firm. Prosecutors also described him as a high-stakes poker player who participated in games involving tens of millions of dollars.
The DOJ alleged that between 2016 and 2023 Goldstein stopped paying taxes on time and engaged in a scheme to evade taxes for 2016. The department said the scheme involved:
concealing millions of dollars in poker wins and losses
diverting legal fees payable to his firm into personal accounts
directing payments to creditors to satisfy poker-related debts
causing personal payments to be recorded as business expenses
Prosecutors said these actions resulted in underreported income and unpaid tax liabilities while Goldstein spent millions on personal expenses including poker, travel and luxury goods.
The DOJ further alleged that in 2021 Goldstein submitted false mortgage applications to two lenders while seeking financing for a $2.6 million home in Washington, D.C.
According to prosecutors, the applications required disclosure of all liabilities and debts, but Goldstein omitted millions of dollars in obligations — including more than $14 million owed on two promissory notes and taxes owed to the IRS.
The DOJ said one lender issued a $1.98 million loan based on the false statements.
The jury convicted Goldstein of:
Tax evasion
Assisting in the preparation of false tax returns
Willful failure to timely pay taxes
Making false statements to mortgage lenders
According to the DOJ, he faces maximum statutory penalties of:
5 years for tax evasion
3 years for each count of assisting false tax returns
1 year for each count of willful failure to pay taxes
30 years for each count of making false statements to mortgage lenders
Any sentence will be determined by a federal district court judge after consideration of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors. The DOJ said a sentencing date has not yet been set.
While the case concerns an individual defendant, the DOJ’s allegations highlight several risk areas that law firms and professional services businesses routinely monitor.
First, the case underscores the importance of strict controls around the handling of client fees and firm revenue. Prosecutors alleged that firm income was diverted to personal accounts — a type of conduct that can quickly trigger tax and fraud exposure if governance is weak.
Second, the DOJ’s claims regarding the classification of personal payments as business expenses illustrate how accounting treatment can become central evidence in tax prosecutions.
Third, the mortgage component serves as a reminder that lenders and investigators may compare borrower disclosures against other financial records over time, particularly where large liabilities are involved.
For firms advising high-earning professionals, the case reinforces the need for clear separation between personal financial activity and firm operations, as well as careful oversight of tax reporting and loan disclosures.
The case now moves to the sentencing phase in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The court will determine any custodial sentence after applying the federal sentencing framework. No sentencing date has been announced.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has obtained final consent judgments against Joseph C. Lewis, Carolyn W. Carter, Patrick J. O’Connor, and Bryan L. Waugh in a civil insider trading enforcement action involving the alleged misuse of material nonpublic information (MNPI).
The case underscores the regulator’s continued focus on tipping chains, personal relationships, and trading tied to confidential investment fund information — all areas that remain high on the SEC’s enforcement agenda in 2026.
According to the SEC, the defendants have been permanently enjoined from violating federal antifraud provisions and ordered to pay civil penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest where applicable.
The SEC’s complaint alleges that Joseph C. Lewis obtained material nonpublic information about two public companies through his majority ownership and control of a biotechnology investment fund.
The regulator claims Lewis breached a duty of trust and confidence by tipping the information to Carolyn W. Carter, his then-girlfriend. According to the SEC, Carter traded in the securities of both companies and realized profits based on the tipped information.
Separately, the SEC alleged Lewis tipped information about one of the companies to his private pilots, Patrick J. O’Connor and Bryan L. Waugh. The agency claims both men traded on that information and generated profits.
The SEC filed the civil enforcement action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on July 26, 2023.
The court entered final consent judgments at different stages:
Joseph C. Lewis: November 26, 2024
Carolyn W. Carter: February 13, 2025
Patrick J. O’Connor and Bryan L. Waugh: February 4, 2026
All defendants were permanently enjoined from violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5.
Civil penalty: $1,636,645.11
Disgorgement: Not ordered
Prejudgment interest: Not ordered
Civil penalty: $241,154.81
Disgorgement: $241,154.81
Prejudgment interest: $43,589.44
Civil penalty: $24,221.53
Disgorgement: $171,886.12
Prejudgment interest: $29,257.46
Civil penalty: $33,126.86
Disgorgement: $132,507.44
Prejudgment interest: $22,554.64
The SEC grounded its enforcement action in:
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Rule 10b-5
These provisions prohibit trading on the basis of material nonpublic information obtained in breach of a duty of trust and confidence.
According to the SEC, the alleged misconduct involved the misuse of confidential information obtained through control of an investment fund and the subsequent tipping of that information to personal associates who traded.
The agency also highlighted coordinated investigative efforts involving multiple domestic and international authorities, reflecting the increasingly global nature of insider trading enforcement.
The case carries several important lessons for compliance teams and investment professionals.
Tipping chains remain a core enforcement priority.
The SEC continues to scrutinize how MNPI flows from insiders to personal contacts, not just professional traders.
Information barriers must extend beyond the firm.
Compliance frameworks should address risks involving family members, romantic partners, and close personal relationships.
Control persons face heightened exposure.
Individuals with ownership or influence over investment vehicles must maintain robust safeguards around confidential information.
Non-traditional tippees are firmly in scope.
The inclusion of private pilots reinforces that insider trading liability can extend well beyond financial market participants.
Cross-border cooperation is accelerating.
The SEC’s reference to assistance from global regulators signals increasingly coordinated enforcement.
Permanent injunctions create ongoing risk.
Firms should factor long-term conduct restrictions into reputational and regulatory risk planning.
Regulator: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Release Date: February 24, 2026
Release Number: Litigation Release No. 26489
Case: SEC v. Joseph C. Lewis, et al.
Court: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
Area of Law: Securities enforcement — insider trading
Status: Final consent judgments entered; permanent injunctions and monetary relief ordered
What did the SEC allege in the Joseph C. Lewis case?
The SEC alleged that Lewis obtained material nonpublic information through a biotechnology investment fund and tipped it to associates who traded on the information, in violation of federal antifraud provisions.
What penalties were imposed?
The court ordered civil penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest against the defendants in varying amounts. All were permanently enjoined from violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.
Did the defendants admit wrongdoing?
According to the SEC release, Carolyn W. Carter and Bryan L. Waugh resolved the case without admitting or denying the allegations. The release does not specify admissions by the other defendants.
Why is MNPI control critical for compliance teams?
Effective controls over material nonpublic information are essential to preventing insider trading risk. Regulators continue to focus closely on how confidential information moves between insiders and personal contacts.
Which court handled the case?
The enforcement action was filed and resolved in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
The U.S. Supreme Court on February 25, 2026, held that federal contractors cannot immediately appeal a district court’s refusal to apply the Yearsley doctrine, clarifying that the doctrine provides a defense to liability—not immunity from suit. The decision in GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal et al. affirms limits on interlocutory appeals under federal law.
The case arose from a class action challenging detainee work policies at a privately operated immigration detention facility in Colorado. GEO Group sought early dismissal, arguing it was shielded because the government had authorized the challenged conduct.
For companies operating under federal contracts, the ruling has immediate litigation consequences: losing a Yearsley motion will usually mean continuing through trial-level proceedings before obtaining appellate review.
GEO Group operates a private detention facility in Aurora, Colorado, under contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Respondent Alejandro Menocal, a former detainee, filed a class action on behalf of detainees challenging two GEO work policies.
According to the opinion, GEO required detainees to perform unpaid cleaning of common areas under a “Sanitation Policy,” with escalating sanctions—including up to 72 hours of solitary confinement—for noncompliance. GEO also ran a “Voluntary Work Program” paying detainees $1 per day for additional tasks such as food preparation and laundry.
Menocal alleged the sanitation policy violated a federal prohibition on forced labor and that the voluntary work program resulted in unjust enrichment under Colorado law.
After discovery, GEO moved for summary judgment, invoking the Supreme Court’s 1940 decision in Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co. GEO argued ICE had “authorized and directed” the challenged policies and that the case should therefore be dismissed.
The district court disagreed, finding the government contract did not require GEO to implement the specific work rules and concluding GEO had “independently develop[ed] and implement[ed]” them. The court held Yearsley did not bar the suit and that a trial was necessary.
GEO sought an immediate appeal. The Tenth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit’s dismissal and held that a pretrial order denying Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. §1291.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kagan explained that Yearsley provides a potential defense to liability, not an immunity from suit. Because merits defenses can be reviewed after final judgment, the denial of Yearsley protection is not “effectively unreviewable” later and therefore does not qualify for interlocutory review under the collateral-order doctrine derived from Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.
The case was affirmed and remanded for further proceedings.
The Court’s analysis focused on the scope of federal appellate jurisdiction under §1291, which generally permits appeals only from “final decisions” of district courts. While the collateral-order doctrine allows a narrow category of interlocutory appeals, the Court emphasized that the doctrine remains “narrow,” “stringent,” and of “modest scope.”
The key question was whether Yearsley confers immunity from suit—which can justify immediate appeal—or merely a defense to liability, which typically cannot.
The Court drew a sharp distinction between:
Merits defenses, which argue the defendant acted lawfully and should not be held liable, and
Immunities, which provide an entitlement not to stand trial at all.
Immunity, the Court explained, protects against the burdens of litigation itself and is effectively lost if a case proceeds to trial. By contrast, a merits defense can be fully vindicated after trial through appellate reversal.
Looking to the 1940 Yearsley decision, the Court concluded the doctrine operates as a liability defense. Under Yearsley, a contractor avoids liability only when:
the government’s authorization was valid, and
the contractor stayed within the scope of that authority.
Because the protection disappears if the contractor exceeded its authority or acted under invalid authorization, the Court said the doctrine turns on the lawfulness of the contractor’s conduct—hallmarks of a merits defense.
The opinion also stressed that sovereign immunity generally does not transfer to government agents or contractors merely because they perform government work. GEO’s characterization of Yearsley as “derivative sovereign immunity,” the Court said, conflicted with that line of precedent.
Once Yearsley was classified as a merits defense, the jurisdictional outcome followed. A denial of the defense can be reviewed after final judgment and therefore is not “effectively unreviewable” later—the third requirement under Cohen.
The Court noted that interlocutory review may still be available in some cases through the separate certification process under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b), but the district court had not certified an appeal here.
Justice Thomas concurred in part and in the judgment, agreeing Yearsley is a defense but questioning reliance on the collateral-order doctrine more broadly. Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, agreeing immediate appeal was unavailable but cautioning that whether a defense turns on legality is not always dispositive in immunity analysis.
Failed Yearsley motions will usually not stop litigation early. Contractors denied Yearsley protection must typically proceed through trial-level proceedings before appealing.
Contract scope and documentation are critical. The district court’s finding that GEO independently implemented the policies shows how contractual language and operational control can determine Yearsley exposure.
Do not rely on “derivative sovereign immunity” framing. The Court squarely rejected treating Yearsley as transferable sovereign immunity.
Budget and strategy planning should reflect longer litigation timelines. Without automatic interlocutory review, contractors may face extended discovery and trial risk.
Section 1292(b) remains a limited safety valve. Immediate review may still be possible if a district court certifies the issue and the appellate court agrees.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. GEO may raise its Yearsley defense on appeal after final judgment if liability is ultimately imposed. The opinion also notes that interlocutory review could occur in other cases through §1292(b) certification, though that did not happen here.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Date: February 25, 2026
Case name: GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal et al.
Docket number: No. 24–758
Area of law: Appellate jurisdiction / government contractor liability
Result: Affirmed and remanded; denial of Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable
What is the Yearsley doctrine?
The Yearsley doctrine protects federal contractors from liability when they act pursuant to valid government authorization and within the scope of that authority. If either condition is missing, the protection does not apply.
Why couldn’t GEO immediately appeal?
The Court ruled Yearsley is a merits defense rather than an immunity from suit. Because the issue can be reviewed after final judgment, it does not qualify for interlocutory appeal under federal law.
Did the Supreme Court decide whether GEO violated forced labor laws?
No. The Court addressed only whether the denial of Yearsley protection could be immediately appealed. The underlying claims remain for further proceedings.
What is the collateral-order doctrine?
It is a narrow exception to the final-judgment rule that permits immediate appeal of certain non-final orders. The Court held the denial of Yearsley protection does not meet that standard.
Can contractors ever get early review of Yearsley issues?
The opinion notes that interlocutory review may be available through the discretionary certification process under 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). That path was not used in this case.
REGENXBIO Inc. and the Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania have won a key appellate reversal in their dispute with Sarepta Therapeutics. On February 20, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 10,526,617 are not directed to a natural phenomenon under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The decision overturns a District of Delaware ruling that had granted Sarepta summary judgment on eligibility and sends the matter back for further proceedings. For life sciences companies litigating biologics and gene-therapy related patents, the opinion underscores the importance of claim language that ties the invention to human-made recombinant constructs, not merely natural sequences.
REGENXBIO and the University of Pennsylvania sued Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc. and Sarepta Therapeutics Three, LLC in the District of Delaware, alleging infringement of claims 1–9, 12, 15, and 18–25 of U.S. Patent No. 10,526,617.
The Federal Circuit describes the ’617 patent as directed to genetically engineered host cells containing adeno-associated virus (AAV) rh.10 sequences. A representative claim recites a cultured host cell containing a recombinant nucleic acid molecule encoding an AAV vp1 capsid protein sequence (AAVrh.10 or a sequence at least 95% identical), where the recombinant nucleic acid molecule further comprises a heterologous non-AAV sequence.
According to the opinion, REGENXBIO accused Sarepta based on Sarepta’s use of an AAV variant (rh.74) in cultured host cells to make a gene therapy product referred to as SRP-9001, described as treating Duchenne muscular dystrophy.
Both sides sought summary judgment on whether the asserted claims were patent-eligible under § 101.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment that the asserted claims are ineligible under § 101 and remanded for further proceedings.
The panel held the claims are not directed to a natural phenomenon, emphasizing that the claims require a recombinant nucleic acid molecule that “does not and cannot exist in nature” and is spliced together through human intervention from at least two different species and inserted into a host cell.
Because the panel concluded the claims are not directed to ineligible subject matter at step one, it did not proceed to step two of the Alice/Mayo framework.
The district court had treated the claims as disclosing natural products and concluded that “combining” natural products in a host cell was not enough, analogizing the claims to Funk Brothers, where mixing naturally occurring bacteria strains was held ineligible.
The Federal Circuit rejected that analogy as inconsistent with the claim requirements and the record described in the opinion. The panel distinguished between (1) simply packaging or mixing natural materials and (2) creating a new, human-made construct that cannot exist in nature on its own.
Central to the court’s reasoning was the claim language requiring:
“recombinant” nucleic acid (created by splicing sequences from different sources), and
a “heterologous” non-AAV sequence (from a different species).
The panel likened the asserted claims to eligibility outcomes where laboratory intervention produces something new, and it criticised the lower court for focusing narrowly on whether the individual natural components were themselves altered, rather than assessing the claimed composition as a whole.
The court also rejected Sarepta’s attempt to characterise the claims as effectively directed only to isolating the AAV rh.10 sequence. The claim language, the panel said, requires a cultured host cell and a recombinant nucleic acid molecule coding for both the capsid sequence and the heterologous non-AAV sequence.
Finally, the Federal Circuit declined to “read out” allegedly conventional limitations for purposes of the § 101 analysis, noting that eligibility should not be collapsed into novelty/obviousness concepts.
Drafting matters: Claim terms like “recombinant” and “heterologous” can be outcome-determinative in § 101 disputes because they anchor the invention to a human-made construct.
§ 101 is not everything: Even where eligibility is revived, defendants can still press other validity theories and noninfringement on remand.
Don’t over-rely on Funk Brothers analogies: Courts may resist product-of-nature framing where the claim requires engineered combinations that cannot arise naturally.
Life sciences portfolios: Patents tied to engineered vectors and host-cell systems may be more defensible on eligibility where the claims clearly require non-natural recombinant structures.
Litigation posture: Expect early § 101 motions, but this decision suggests plaintiffs have a strong response when claims are built around non-natural recombinant constructs.
The Federal Circuit returned the case to the District of Delaware for proceedings consistent with its opinion. The decision resolves the eligibility ruling under § 101 but does not decide infringement, remedies, or other potential validity challenges.
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Date: February 20, 2026
Case name: Regenxbio Inc. v. Sarepta Therapeutics, Inc.
Docket number: 24-1408
Area of law: Patent infringement / patent eligibility (35 U.S.C. § 101)
Result: Reversed and remanded (summary judgment of ineligibility reversed)
1) What did the Federal Circuit decide in Regenxbio v. Sarepta?
The court reversed a Delaware district court’s summary judgment that the asserted claims were ineligible under § 101. It held the claims were not directed to a natural phenomenon and remanded.
2) Why did the district court rule against REGENXBIO under § 101?
The district court concluded the claims disclosed natural products and that combining them in a host cell did not make the invention patentable, relying in part on a Funk Brothers analogy.
3) Why did the Federal Circuit reject the Funk Brothers comparison?
The panel said the claims require a recombinant nucleic acid molecule and a heterologous sequence—human-made constructs that cannot exist in nature on their own—unlike simply mixing natural strains.
4) What role did “recombinant” and “heterologous” play in the decision?
The court treated those terms as key structural limitations showing the claimed nucleic acid is created by human intervention using sequences from different sources and species.
5) Does the remand mean REGENXBIO has won the case?
No. The ruling addresses eligibility under § 101 and returns the case to the district court; other disputes such as infringement and other validity issues remain open.
Global securities class actions generated more than $4bn in investor recoveries in 2025, underscoring sustained litigation activity despite shifting market conditions. The latest annual analysis from Broadridge Financial Solutions points to a disputes landscape that is becoming more complex, more international and increasingly shaped by artificial intelligence and ESG-related claims.
The report highlights how class action participation is evolving from a largely passive process into a more operational and strategically managed function for institutional investors.
According to Broadridge’s seventh Global Class Action Annual Report, global securities and antitrust settlements generated just over $4bn in recoveries during 2025, compared with $5.2bn in 2024. While slightly lower year on year, the figures remain historically elevated against a backdrop of volatile markets and expanding cross-border litigation frameworks.
Nine settlements exceeded the $100m threshold during the year, only marginally below the record pace set in 2024. US federal securities filings also remained relatively stable at 205 cases, broadly in line with the four-year rolling average.
One of the most significant developments identified in the report is the continued rise of AI-related securities litigation. Broadridge recorded a growing number of claims alleging misleading disclosures concerning artificial intelligence capabilities, earnings expectations and risk controls.
Twelve new AI-linked cases were filed in 2025 alone, contributing to more than 50 such filings over the past five years. Many claims centre on so-called “AI washing”, where companies are alleged to have overstated technological sophistication or commercial readiness.
The trend reflects intensifying regulatory and investor scrutiny around how issuers describe the financial impact and operational maturity of AI initiatives.
The report also highlights accelerating adoption of opt-in and collective redress mechanisms, particularly across Europe. More than 100 collective redress claims were filed in Europe during 2025, signalling the continued maturation of the region’s group litigation landscape.
Jurisdictional developments are reinforcing the shift toward earlier and more active participation by institutional investors. In Australia, for example, the growing use of “soft class closures” — requiring investors to register before mediation — illustrates how procedural rules are evolving to encourage proactive engagement.
For global asset managers and custodians, these changes are increasing the operational complexity of claims management and recovery strategies.
Environmental, social and governance issues remain a significant driver of securities litigation risk. Broadridge notes that ESG-focused claims continued to grow during 2025, reflecting rising investor activism and heightened expectations around corporate disclosure.
With global ESG investment projected to reach $30tn by 2030, shareholder actions tied to governance, sustainability and compliance issues are expected to remain a prominent feature of the disputes landscape.
Separate survey data from Norton Rose Fulbright indicates that US corporate counsel reported increased exposure to ESG-related class actions in 2025, alongside a sharp rise in cybersecurity and data privacy claims.
The broader picture emerging from market participants is one of growing procedural and jurisdictional complexity. Differences in filing requirements, settlement mechanics and participation rules across jurisdictions are making recovery strategies more demanding for institutional investors.
At the same time, claimant firms are increasingly pursuing privacy and data-driven class actions across multiple jurisdictions, including the US, UK, EU and Canada, according to analysis from Dentons.
Courts in England and Wales have shown caution toward opt-out privacy claims, while the Netherlands continues to develop as a key European venue for collective redress actions under the EU’s Representative Actions Directive framework.
The practical takeaway is that securities class actions are becoming more global, data-driven and procedurally complex, requiring earlier and more coordinated engagement from investors and corporate legal teams.
Taken together, the latest data suggests that global class action participation is evolving into a more strategically significant discipline for institutional investors, custodians and corporate defendants alike.
As AI disclosures, ESG accountability and cross-border collective mechanisms continue to develop, the operational demands of securities litigation — and the associated recovery opportunities — are likely to remain firmly on the radar of corporate legal and risk teams through 2026 and beyond.
Neonatal injury litigation sits at one of the most complex intersections of medicine and law. Establishing causation in cases involving birth asphyxia, hypoglycaemia, or long-term neurodevelopmental conditions requires not only clinical expertise but a rigorous understanding of evolving scientific evidence and multidisciplinary care pathways.
Dr Michael Munro, consultant neonatologist and founder of MJM Medico Legal Services, has spent over two decades working at the frontline of neonatal intensive care. In addition to leading clinical teams and contributing to hospital design, he provides independent expert opinion in complex perinatal and neonatal negligence cases.
In this interview, Dr Munro discusses how neonatal care has evolved, the recurring themes in birth injury litigation, and the challenges of presenting clear, balanced medical evidence in court.
Dr Michael Munro, founder of MJM Medico Legal Services, provides independent expert opinion in complex neonatal and perinatal negligence cases.
Neonatal intensive care is an intensely hands-on specialty. Multiple resuscitations can occur in a single day, and the immediacy of those situations — where decisions made in minutes can affect an entire lifetime — is something I have always found both challenging and rewarding.
Over the years, neonatal care has evolved significantly. Historically, the emphasis was primarily on survival and acute clinical stabilisation. Today, we take a far more holistic approach, incorporating developmental care and recognising the impact of environment and parental interaction on neurological outcomes.
One major development has been transitional care, where mothers and babies remain together even when the baby has medical needs. This promotes bonding and strengthens the family unit while still providing appropriate clinical oversight.
My own role has evolved from junior team member to clinical leader. Over the past decade, I led the design and construction of Aberdeen’s Baird Family Hospital, which includes a Level 3 neonatal unit built around family-centred principles.
Through long-term follow-up of neonatal graduates, it became increasingly apparent that while some preterm or asphyxiated infants avoid conditions such as cerebral palsy, they may later develop behavioural or cognitive difficulties.
Autism is a particularly complex example. The aetiology is generally considered to involve both genetic and environmental components, and the scientific literature continues to evolve. In researching this area extensively, I was struck by how broad an expert’s knowledge base must be — and how important it is to remain current.
For an expert witness, it reinforces the importance of evidence-based reasoning. Medical understanding is not static. An opinion must reflect contemporary science, not historical thinking.
Completion of resuscitation courses alone does not establish competence. In the UK, Newborn Life Support (NLS) and the Neonatal Resuscitation Program (NRP) internationally both emphasise that validation does not equal competency.
Competency comes from supervised clinical application. Trainees must undertake formal training and then apply those principles under senior supervision, with structured feedback and debriefing.
When assessing a case, I examine whether appropriate training was completed, whether supervision was available, whether recognised protocols were followed, and whether there was effective post-event reflection.
Simulation training now also plays a crucial role. Modern high-fidelity simulation allows realistic rehearsal of emergency scenarios and is essential for maintaining safe practice.
Many cases are perinatal rather than purely neonatal, meaning obstetric and midwifery perspectives are equally important.
As a neonatologist, I am often asked to determine causation for injuries that may have originated before birth or during labour. Establishing timing and mechanism requires careful review of antenatal history, intrapartum events, neonatal condition, biochemical markers, and imaging.
Neuroimaging frequently forms part of the evidence, but interpretation of CT or MRI scans may require specialist neuroradiology input. Genetic and metabolic testing is also increasingly relevant.
The challenge lies in synthesising multiple strands of evidence coherently and remaining within one’s own area of expertise.
Avoidable hypoglycaemia remains one of the most common causes of neonatal litigation. Brain injury resulting from untreated or inadequately managed low blood sugar continues to arise, often linked to protocol failures or gaps in knowledge.
More recently, I have been involved in a growing number of cases concerning autism and alleged links to perinatal events. With rising diagnosis rates, questions around causation are increasingly common in litigation.
These cases are medically and legally complex, particularly where causation is disputed.
Scientific evidence is essential, but it is rarely absolute. In cases of long-term neurodevelopmental impairment, neuroimaging may provide limited clarity regarding causation.
Conventional MRI cannot diagnose autism and cannot determine how it developed. At the same time, MRI may demonstrate evidence of perinatal asphyxia, and epidemiological studies suggest such events increase the risk of later neurodevelopmental issues.
Emerging imaging techniques — including 3D volumetric MRI, diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), functional MRI (fMRI), and magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) — may provide greater clarity in the future, potentially supported by artificial intelligence. Until then, courts must often rely on epidemiological data rather than definitive imaging findings.
Clarity is critical. Medical terminology, abbreviations, and statistical analysis can easily overwhelm a non-clinical audience.
I prepare structured reports that explain terminology carefully and avoid unnecessary jargon. Analogies drawn from everyday life can help clarify complex mechanisms. Where statistical evidence is involved, particularly in meta-analyses, it is essential to understand precisely what the data does — and does not — demonstrate.
An expert’s duty is not only to provide an opinion but to ensure it can be understood.
Complete documentation is essential. Maternal obstetric records are often critical, particularly resuscitation records and antenatal history.
It is also important to involve appropriate experts at the correct stage. In alleged intrapartum asphyxia cases, obstetric expertise is typically required to address liability, while neonatal expertise informs causation and postnatal management.
Early multidisciplinary expert involvement — before formal proceedings are issued — can significantly strengthen case preparation and ensure no relevant breach of duty is overlooked.
Neonatal medical negligence cases demand precision, balance, and multidisciplinary awareness. As Dr Michael Munro’s experience demonstrates, determining causation in birth injury claims requires not only clinical expertise but a careful synthesis of evolving scientific evidence.
In one of healthcare’s most sensitive and high-stakes fields, the expert witness plays a vital role in helping courts navigate complexity with clarity and objectivity.
What is neonatal injury litigation?
Neonatal injury litigation involves medical negligence claims arising from care provided before, during or shortly after birth, often involving brain injury, hypoglycaemia or asphyxia.
How is causation proven in birth injury cases?
Causation is typically established through a combination of medical records, expert testimony, neuroimaging, biochemical markers, and epidemiological evidence.
Can MRI scans prove autism was caused by birth injury?
Conventional MRI cannot diagnose autism or determine its cause. Courts often rely on epidemiological data rather than definitive imaging findings.
What is the most common cause of neonatal negligence claims?
Avoidable hypoglycaemia and delayed recognition of perinatal asphyxia remain common causes of neonatal brain injury litigation.
Who provides expert evidence in neonatal brain injury cases?
Neonatologists, obstetricians, neuroradiologists and sometimes genetic specialists may all contribute expert opinion depending on the issues in dispute.
Cross-border enforcement has become the decisive phase of high-value arbitration. Awards of substantial scale increasingly encounter layered corporate structures, nominee shareholdings and offshore holding vehicles.
The recent decision of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, arising from efforts to enforce a US$1.6 billion ICC award in the British Virgin Islands, offers a clear statement of how such structures are likely to be treated when subjected to proprietary enforcement.
Although framed as an appeal concerning joinder and service out, the judgment addresses a more fundamental issue: whether shares registered in the name of a third party may be charged on the basis that they are beneficially owned by the award debtor. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and, in doing so, clarified the scope and coherence of the BVI court’s enforcement jurisdiction.
The Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in Tortola, where the BVI Commercial Court hears high-value arbitration enforcement disputes.
The respondents had obtained an ICC arbitration award seated in the Dubai International Financial Centre against Sirwan Saber Mustapha, also known as Mr. Barzani, in excess of US$1.6 billion.
The award was subsequently registered in the Commercial Division of the High Court of the British Virgin Islands pursuant to the Arbitration Act. It remains wholly unsatisfied.
During enforcement investigations, the respondents asserted that Mr. Barzani held a beneficial interest in shares of OS International Limited, a BVI company. Those shares were not registered in his name. They were registered in the name of Mr. Zekri Basheer Shani and another individual.
The respondents’ case was that the registered shareholder held the shares as nominee for the award debtor. On that footing, they sought a provisional charging order under CPR Part 48.
The Commercial Court granted the provisional order, joined Mr. Shani to the enforcement proceedings, and permitted service out of the jurisdiction. Proprietary and freezing relief was also granted.
Mr. Shani sought to set aside those orders. His application was largely unsuccessful. He appealed.
A central argument on appeal was that the original arbitration recognition proceedings contained no pleaded claim against Mr. Shani. The award had already been registered. It was contended that, in the absence of a pleaded cause of action, joinder was impermissible.
The Court of Appeal rejected that proposition.
Under CPR 19.2(3), the court may add a party if it is desirable to do so in order to resolve all matters in dispute, or if there is an issue involving the new party connected to matters already in dispute. The Court emphasised that enforcement steps taken after registration of an award remain part of the same “proceedings”. The term is to be given a broad and functional interpretation.
Joinder does not require the existence of a freestanding cause of action against the party to be added. What is required is a connected issue that the court must resolve in order to give effect to the judgment. Here, that issue was beneficial ownership of shares alleged to be amenable to proprietary enforcement.
The Court further observed that joinder in these circumstances serves procedural fairness. It ensures that the registered shareholder may be heard on the issue and will be bound by the outcome.
The judgment therefore confirms that post-judgment joinder is available where necessary to adjudicate disputes directly affecting enforcement.
Because Mr. Shani resided outside the jurisdiction, service out required satisfaction of the CPR Part 7 gateways. The Court applied the established principles: the existence of a serious issue to be tried, a good arguable case that a gateway applies, and the appropriateness of the forum.
The serious issue was the identity of the beneficial owner of the shares. That dispute had crystallised once the respondents asserted beneficial ownership and the award debtor denied holding assets within the jurisdiction.
The Court held that, once joinder was proper, the “necessary or proper party” gateway under CPR 7.3(2)(a) was engaged. The scope of that gateway was described as no narrower than the court’s power to add a party under CPR 19. In practical terms, if it is proper to join a party to resolve an enforcement dispute, it will ordinarily be proper to serve them under that gateway.
As to forum, the analysis was direct. Under section 245 of the Business Companies Act, the situs of shares in a BVI company is in the Virgin Islands. The application was statutory in nature and concerned property located within the jurisdiction. There was no credible basis to contend that another forum was more appropriate.
The service-out challenge therefore failed.
The more structurally significant aspect of the decision concerns the nature of charging orders.
A charging order creates a proprietary interest in the asset charged. It is distinct from a freezing injunction, which operates in personam and does not confer security. Section 14 of the Judgments Act 1838 empowers the court to charge stocks and shares beneficially owned by a judgment debtor, whether standing in his own name or in the name of another holding on trust.
The Court reaffirmed that beneficial ownership is the decisive question. Legal title is neither necessary nor sufficient. If the judgment debtor is beneficially entitled to the shares, a charging order may attach notwithstanding nominee registration.
This analysis reinforces a core feature of offshore enforcement: nominee structures do not insulate assets where beneficial ownership can be established.
The appellant argued that personal jurisdiction over him was required before a final charging order could be made. The Court did not accept that personal jurisdiction was determinative.
The proprietary character of a charging order, combined with the lex situs principle, means that the court’s authority derives from the location of the property. Shares in a BVI company are situate in the BVI. The court’s power over them is territorial and proprietary.
Where beneficial ownership is disputed, the appropriate course is to direct a trial within the charging order proceedings. The judgment creditor is not required to abandon enforcement and commence entirely separate litigation.
The Court’s reasoning confirms that enforcement against shares in offshore companies is grounded in proprietary jurisdiction rather than purely personal jurisdiction.
Although the appeal turned on procedural grounds, the decision underscores the evidential demands of modern enforcement.
CPR Part 48 requires affidavit evidence asserting that the debtor is beneficially entitled to the shares. Where that assertion is contested, the court may direct a trial. Such disputes are rarely resolved by reference to registration alone.
Beneficial ownership inquiries in complex corporate structures frequently require examination of shareholding histories, corporate governance arrangements, funding flows, trust relationships and control mechanisms. The burden lies initially on the judgment creditor to establish a prima facie case. Once that threshold is crossed, the registered holder must respond.
The Court’s approach reflects an acceptance that high-value award enforcement will often involve substantive factual adjudication rather than purely mechanical execution.
The appeal was dismissed in its entirety, with costs awarded against the appellant.
The decision confirms several structural features of offshore enforcement practice.
Enforcement proceedings remain live after registration of an award and may expand to resolve disputes necessary to give effect to it. Nominee shareholding arrangements do not preclude proprietary enforcement where beneficial ownership is alleged. Charging orders attach to assets within the jurisdiction by reference to their situs, not merely the residence of the registered holder.
For arbitration practitioners, the message is clear. Enforcement planning must anticipate disputes over beneficial ownership in offshore structures. Asset mapping and evidential preparation are not ancillary considerations; they are integral to the enforcement strategy.
For expert witnesses operating in the arbitration sphere, the decision illustrates the terrain on which enforcement disputes increasingly unfold. Beneficial ownership challenges in offshore jurisdictions are unlikely to be resolved on procedural technicalities alone. They turn on evidence.
In that respect, the judgment is less about joinder and more about the architecture of modern arbitration enforcement. It confirms that proprietary remedies, applied within the correct jurisdictional framework, remain a powerful instrument in the post-award phase — even where assets are held through nominee structures.
Police are facing potential legal action after an internal review found serious investigative failures following the death of Scott Gough, a 56-year-old man who may have been the victim of a Grindr-linked blackmail scheme.
Mr Gough died within 24 hours of six men arriving at his home near Watford, knocking aggressively on the door, demanding the keys to his Range Rover, and leaving a handwritten note on the vehicle instructing him to make contact. His partner, Cameron Tewson, who was alone at the property, called emergency services but later said his concerns were not treated with sufficient seriousness — an allegation denied by Hertfordshire Police.
A subsequent review by the force’s Professional Standards Department concluded that officers failed to recognise “sufficient suspicion to record a crime,” despite a growing body of intelligence that should have triggered a formal blackmail investigation.
A civilian investigator later ran police database checks on a burner phone number written on the note left on Mr Gough’s vehicle in Chandlers Cross on March 28, 2024. The number was unregistered but was found to be in frequent contact with a male suspect linked to other extortion offences.
At the same time, the Metropolitan Police were conducting Operation Welby, an investigation into burglaries and extortion schemes targeting gay dating app users who were tricked into letting offenders into their homes via Grindr.
Despite this context, the investigator concluded that because the burner number had not directly contacted Mr Gough’s phone, there was no indication of blackmail. That assessment was later criticised internally as overly narrow and inconsistent with the wider intelligence picture.
CCTV footage also placed a Mercedes linked to suspects aged between 18 and 23 near Mr Gough’s property on the night of the incident. Those same individuals were connected to other blackmail cases involving older men. When officers visited them, however, they were treated as individuals “requiring safeguarding” rather than potential suspects.
Scott Gough, 56, died within hours of an alleged extortion visit at his home near Watford, now under police review.
The internal report identified “missed opportunities” to obtain accounts from those individuals and to secure and download their mobile phones. Instead, officers from the Child Online Safety Team approached the men weeks later in what was described as an “informal intervention,” offering what police later characterised as “stern words of advice.”
The review concluded that while the note alone may not have met the evidential threshold for a blackmail offence, the broader context did. It stated that the combination of intelligence from similar cases, CCTV evidence, and family-provided information collectively amounted to reasonable grounds to suspect Mr Gough had been a victim of blackmail.
The report further criticised supervisory oversight, stating that these indicators should have been identified and escalated and that the failure to do so was “not acceptable.”
The case raises important questions about how police assess suspicion thresholds in extortion and blackmail cases, particularly those involving coercion rather than direct financial demands.
Once reasonable suspicion exists, police are expected to take proportionate investigative steps, including securing digital evidence and treating connected individuals as potential suspects rather than safeguarding cases alone. The failure to seize or examine mobile devices is particularly significant in blackmail investigations, where communications data often forms the core evidential foundation.
The review acknowledged that the delay may have resulted in the permanent loss of evidential material, limiting the scope of any future prosecution and complicating accountability assessments.
Mr Tewson has instructed Dr Anton van Dellen, the barrister who represented the partner of Daniel Whitworth, one of the victims in the Stephen Port serial killing case. That investigation was later criticised for systemic failures and described by an inquest jury as institutionally homophobic.
Mr Tewson said the reinvestigation confirms that available intelligence, digital material, and third-party involvement were not properly examined at the outset. He warned that the passage of time has undermined accountability through degraded evidence and fading recollections.
Separately, under Operation Welby, offenders Rahmat Khan Mohammadi and Mohammed Bilal Hotak were jailed at Isleworth Crown Court after using Grindr to arrange meetings with victims before stealing high-value items including Rolex watches and electronic devices.
Hertfordshire Police confirmed that an independent department will now review whether a blackmail investigation should have been opened and whether investigative decisions fell below professional standards. The force acknowledged that the time taken to address the complaint was unacceptable and said structural changes had since been made to its complaints handling process.
The force reiterated its commitment to supporting LGBTQ+ victims, citing dedicated liaison officers and ongoing training aimed at improving trust and reporting outcomes.
The ownership and scope of the independent review have yet to be finalised.
